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Abstract
Patent licensing agreements among competing firms usually involve royalties which are
often considered to be anticompetitive as they raise market prices. In this paper we pro-
pose simple tax policies than can alleviate the effect of royalties. Considering a Cournot
duopoly where firms produce under decreasing returns and trade a patented technol-
ogy, we show that the interaction of royalties with decreasing returns may generate the
counter-intuitive result that market prices decrease in the magnitude of diseconomies
of scale. In such cases there exist progressive quantity taxes on firms that weaken the
effect of royalties and lower the market prices. These taxes collect sufficient revenue
to compensate firms for their losses. As a result, it is possible to design deficit neutral
tax-transfer schemes that strictly Pareto improve the welfare of consumers as well as
firms.
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1 Introduction
A patent grants an innovator monopoly rights over its innovation for a given period
of time. It seeks to provide incentives to innovate as well as to diffuse innovations.
Since Arrow (1962), it has been recognized that under a patent system, there is often a
conflict between private and social incentives of innovation. An innovation that results
in an efficient production technology may not yield its full benefits to consumers, as
market prices may not fall significantly. This is due to the distortion created by specific
licensing policies used by the patent holder to disseminate its innovation.1 Specifically,
it has been argued by Shapiro (1985) and Wang (1998) that if a patent holder is one
of the incumbent firms in an oligopoly, it has incentives to use royalties to license its
innovation to its rivals. Royalties give competitive edge to the innovator, but distort
the innovation and lead to higher prices. One standard policy intervention to remedy
this could be to provide either direct or indirect subsidies to firms, but fiscal constraints
may prevent governments to follow such policies.
In this paper we identify situations in oligopolies where, with a patent system in
place, the government can lower market prices through quantity taxation on firms. In
addition to this surprising effect of taxation on market prices, the tax collects sufficient
revenue to compensate firms for their potential losses. Consequently it is possible to
design deficit neutral tax-transfer schemes that strictly Pareto improve the welfare of
consumers as well as the firms in the market.
We carry out our analysis in a Cournot duopoly where both firms have increasing
and linear marginal costs of production, i.e., the production technology exhibits de-
creasing returns to scale. One of the firms has a patent on a technological innovation
that results in a downward shift of the marginal cost line. The patent holder can either
use the new technology exclusively or license it to its rival. The available licensing
policies consist of all combinations of upfront fees and royalties (two-part tariffs).
The starting point of the analysis is the characterization of optimal licensing poli-
cies. We show that regardless of the magnitude of the innovation, the patent holder
has incentive to license the new technology to its rival. Moreover, the optimal licensing
policy always involves positive royalties, which is also the case with constant returns
(e.g., Shapiro 1985; Wang 1998). However, royalties interact with decreasing returns
to generate certain counter-intuitive effects which are absent under constant returns.
The rate of optimal royalty falls with the strength of decreasing returns. As a result,
decreasing returns affects market price through two channels. Stronger decreasing re-
turns have the direct effect of raising the price, but they have the indirect effect of
lowering royalties which reduces the price. We identify robust regions where the in-
direct effect dominates the direct effect and consequently, stronger decreasing returns
result in lower market price.
Consider the regions where stronger decreasing returns lead in lower price. Suppose
the government introduces a quantity tax on each firm which is increasing and convex
in the quantity it sells. As the marginal tax is increasing in quantity, this tax is “pro-
gressive” in nature. The introduction of this tax effectively strengthens the magnitude
1Kamien and Tauman (1984, 1986) and Katz and Shapiro (1985, 1986) first studied the problem
of patent licensing in oligopolies. See Kamien (1992) for a survey.
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of decreasing returns for firms. Within the parametric configuration of the model, we
show that it is possible for the government to design this tax in a way that weakens
the effect of royalties and reduces the market price. However, doing so necessarily
makes one or both firms worse off. We show that the tax generates sufficient revenue
to compensate firms for their losses. Consequently, it is then possible to design tax and
transfer schemes (i.e. taxation together with lump-sum transfers to firms) that make
consumers as well as the firms better off. The scheme finances itself and thus achieves
deficit neutrality.
The perverse effects of taxation in imperfectly competitive markets have been also
shown in de Meza et al (1995) who find that imposing an ad-valorem tax in Cournot
markets can reduce prices. Their result is driven by the presence of increasing returns
to scale. The introduction of the tax induces some firms to exit, allowing the remain-
ing ones to exploit increasing returns to scale so efficiently that the post-tax price falls
below the pre-tax level. Interestingly, our result is driven by the completely oppo-
site effect of scale economies: decreasing returns (and their interaction with licensing
policies).
Our paper relates to the literature that analyzes Pareto-improving tax policies
in economies with imperfectly competitive markets. Konishi et al. (1990) consider
tax-subsidy policies in general equilibrium models with one competitive and one non-
competitive production sectors. Assuming that the competitive (non-competitive) sec-
tor operates under constant (increasing) returns to scale the authors provide specific
tax-subsidy schemes that raise the welfare of the representative consumer. Dillen (1995)
analyzes efficiency-restoring policies in general equilibrium frameworks under the as-
sumption that firms compete in prices. Ushio (2000) studies the impact of small com-
modity taxes in a Cournot market with asymmetric firms (under partial equilibrium).
Although taxation reduces consumer surplus, social welfare might increase as taxes
shift production from inefficient to efficient firms (and hence substantial cost savings
are created). Wang (2011) shows that in economies where all commodities are taxable,
the optimal tax rates should equalize the Lerner indexes of commodities. The tax
system raises welfare provided labor supply is sufficiently inelastic.
This paper is also indirectly related to a large literature on Pigouvian taxation
(e.g., Pigou, 1932; Baumol, 1972; Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1986) which studies the role
of taxes in correcting externalities generated by market activities. In a market where
production results in negative externalities, Carlton and Loury (1980) [CL] argue that
imposition of a Pigouvian tax (i.e., a per unit tax) on firms leads to socially efficient
outcome in the short run, but in the long-run, a lump-sum transfer together with the
unit tax is required to achieve efficiency. However, such tax-transfer schemes may raise
deficits. Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (2008) [GP] show that in (almost all) pure
exchange economies with separable externalities, a tax-transfer scheme can be used to
Pareto improve upon competitive equilibria. Although we study the role of taxes in
the context of technology transfer rather than externalities, our paper shares the broad
theme that taxes can be used to improve market outcomes. One key difference with
both CL and GP is that we look at imperfectly competitive markets. Consequently,
the choices of firms (e.g., the nature of licensing contracts in the technology transfer
stage) affect market prices. We show that there exist progressive quantity taxes that
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“correct” the licensing contracts in a way that is beneficial for consumers.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the optimal
licensing policy. Section 3 discusses the inverse relation between market price and
decreasing returns. Section 4 analyzes tax-transfer schemes and their welfare impact.
Concluding remarks are presented in the last section. All proofs are placed in the
Appendix.
2 The model
• Demand: Consider a Cournot duopoly with firms 1 and 2. For i = 1, 2, let qi be the
quantity produced by firm i and letQ be the industry output, i.e., Q = q1+q2. Denoting
by p the market price, the inverse demand function of the industry is p = max{a−Q, 0}
where a > 0.
• Cost: There is an existing technology under which both firms have the identical linear
marginal cost function
µ(q) = bq + c where 0 < c < a and b > 0 (1)
As µ(q) is increasing in q, the technology exhibits decreasing returns to scale.
• New technology: One of the firms, say firm 1, is granted a patent for a new technology
that leads to a reduction in the production cost. Specifically the new technology results
in the marginal cost function
µε(q) = bq + c− ε where 0 < ε < c (2)
So ε is the magnitude of innovation.2
• Licensing policies: The patent holder (firm 1) carries out its production with the
new technology. It may also license the new technology to its rival firm 2. The set
of licensing policies available to firm 1 is the set of all combinations of a unit royalty
r ≥ 0 and an upfront fee α ≥ 0, so a typical policy is given by (r, α). If firm 2 does
not have a license, its marginal cost is µ(q). If it has a license under a policy (r, α), its
effective marginal cost becomes µε(q) + r. Notice that firm 2 will not accept a policy
with r > ε. So it is sufficient to consider royalties r ∈ [0, ε].
• The game Gb: The strategic interaction between the two firms is modeled as an
extensive-form game Gb that has three stages. In the first stage, firm 1 decides whether
to license the new technology to firm 2 or not. If firm 1 licenses, it offers a policy (r, α)
where r ∈ [0, ε] and α ≥ 0. In the second stage, firm 2 decides whether to accept or
reject the licensing policy (if any is offered). Finally, in the third stage, the two firms
compete in quantities. If firm 2 operates under a policy (r, α) and produces q units, it
pays rq + α to firm 1.
In what follows we analyze the above game by confining to its Subgame Perfect
Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) outcomes.
2We consider the innovation to be a downward shift of the marginal cost line which lowers c without
affecting the slope b. This makes our analysis comparable to the existing literature as by taking b = 0,
we have the standard case of constant returns.
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2.1 Cournot equilibrium
We begin with the last stage of the game where firms compete as Cournot duopolists.
If firm 2 does not have a license, the payoff of firm i is simply its profit in the Cournot
duopoly. Denote this profit by pii(q1, q2). Then
pii(q1, q2) = (a− q1 − q2)qi − ciqi − bq2i /2, i = 1, 2 (3)
where c1 = c− ε and c2 = c. Denoting by pii(r, q1, q2) the duopoly profit of firm i when
firm 2 has a license with rate of royalty r, we have
pi1(r, q1, q2) = (a− q1 − q2)q1 − (c− ε)q1 − bq21/2 (4)
pi2(r, q1, q2) = (a− q1 − q2)q2 − (c− ε+ r)q2 − bq22/2 (5)
When there is licensing, the total payoff Π1 of firm 1 is the sum of its duopoly profit
and licensing revenue. For firm 2, note from (5) that royalty r is part of its marginal
cost and royalty payments are already included in its duopoly profit. So firm 2’s total
payoff Π2 is its duopoly profit net of fixed fees. Consequently under a licensing policy
(r, α), we have
Π1(r, α) = pi1(r, q1, q2) + rq2 + α, Π2(r, α) = pi2(r, q1, q2)− α (6)
To determine the SPNE of Gb, we need to consider the Nash equilibrium (NE) outcome
of the Cournot duopoly where firms choose q1, q2 simultaneously and obtain profits
given by (3) or (5). The equilibrium for this market is computed and presented in
Lemma A2 in the Appendix.
Our analysis considers drastic as well as non-drastic innovations. A cost-reducing
innovation is drastic (Arrow 1962) if it is significant enough to create a monopoly
whenever one firm only uses the new technology; otherwise it is non-drastic. Lemma A2
in the Appendix shows that an innovation of magnitude ε is drastic if ε ≥ (b+1)(a−c)
and it is non-drastic if ε < (b+ 1)(a− c).
2.2 Technology transfer
Given the previous analysis, in this section we determine whether technology transfer
occurs or not. Let q̂i, pii denote the NE output and profit of firm i in the no-licensing
scenario; let qi(r),pii(r) denote the NE output and profit of firm i if licensing occurs
under royalty r; finally let piM denote the monopoly profit under the new technology.
Consider a licensing policy (r, α). Using (6), the payoffs under this policy are given
by
Π1(r, α) = pi1(r) + rq2(r) + α, Π2(r, α) = pi2(r)− α
If firm 2 rejects the policy, then it obtains pi2. Hence for any r ∈ [0, ε], it is optimal
for firm 1 to set the fixed fee equal to α = pi2(r) − pi2, making firm 2 just indifferent
between accepting and rejecting the licensing offer. Therefore, if firm 1 decides to offer
a license, its problem reduces to choosing r ∈ [0, ε] to maximize
Π1(r) = pi1(r) + rq2(r) + pi2(r)− pi2 (7)
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The following proposition characterizes the outcome of the licensing interaction and
the optimal licensing policy.
Proposition 1 For any b > 0, the game Gb has a unique SPNE outcome. It has the
following properties.
(I) Regardless of whether the innovation is drastic or non-drastic, licensing always
occurs.
(II) Firm 2 always obtains the net payoff pi2, and is just indifferent between accepting
and rejecting the licensing offer. This payoff is zero for drastic innovations and
positive for non-drastic innovations.
(III) ∃ `(b) < b+ 1, which is decreasing with limb→∞`(b) = 0 such that
(a) If ε ≤ `(b)(a− c), the licensing policy has royalty ε and no fixed fee.
(b) If ε > `(b)(a − c), the licensing policy has royalty rb(ε) < ε and fixed fee
α = pi2(rb(ε))− pi2 > 0. The royalty rate rb(ε) is decreasing in b.
Proof See the Appendix.
For non-drastic innovations, firm 1 cannot drive its rival out of the market by
not offering a license. By choosing a royalty policy r = ε firm 1 obtains positive
royalty revenue and at the same time ensures that 2 effectively operates under the
old technology. Since offering no license is dominated by this specific licensing policy,
licensing is generally optimal for non-drastic innovations. This result does not depend
on the nature of scale economies.
For drastic innovations, firm 1 can become the monopolist by using the innovation
exclusively. Still it prefers to license to its rival. To see the intuition, observe that
under decreasing returns to scale, production of a large output by a single firm creates
cost inefficiencies. Hence firm 1 has incentive to keep firm 2 in the market: the presence
of two active firms increases efficiency and results in higher surplus than the monopoly
profit, which firm 1 then extracts via a fixed fee.
The optimal mixture of fees and royalties is determined by two factors. First, firm
1 intends to create a relatively inefficient rival and second, it has to consider how the
rival’s efficiency affects its own marginal cost. Under decreasing returns to scale, these
two factors work in opposite direction. A less efficient rival implies higher output and
higher marginal cost for firm 1. The relation between the magnitude of innovation and
the size of decreasing returns plays an important role to resolve the conflict, as we
explain below.
Recall by Prop 1(III) that the threshold `(b) is decreasing in b (the intensity of
decreasing returns). Hence we can restate the two parts of Prop 1(III) in terms of
b being low or high: If b is low then the impact of decreasing returns on firm 1’s
marginal cost is relatively low. Hence, the incentive of creating an inefficient rival is
more important. Accordingly, a pure royalty policy with maximum royalty equal to ε
is used. If b is high, the impact of decreasing returns is high too. Thus, firm 1 prefers
to provide a certain degree of cost efficiency to firm 2 so that it (i.e., firm 1) avoids
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operating in relatively inefficient production zones. For this reason, the rate of royalty
is set below ε.
Note that the above explain also why the royalty rate rb(ε) is decreasing in b.
Higher values of b means the innovator faces higher marginal cost. By designing a
royalty that decreases in b the innovator ”commits” to a relatively smaller quantity (as
the reduced royalty raises the quantity of the rival firm), thus staying in a relatively
efficient production zone.
3 Post-licensing price
Let us now study how post-innovation market equilibrium (market price and industry
output) behave vis-a-vis the intensity of diseconomies of scale. For our purposes, we
shall focus on changes of b, i.e., the slope of marginal cost line. Note first that if the
marginal cost of firm i is µ(qi) = bqi + ci, a higher value of b raises the intensity of
diseconomies of scale3 (or raises marginal cost) provided that b + ∂qi/∂b > 0. We can
show that the latter inequality holds in our model.
Below we identify a paradox: given the licensing policy described in the previous
section, we find ranges of parameter values under which an increase in b raises industry
output and hence lowers market price.
Proposition 2 Let p0(b) be the post-licensing Cournot price in the SPNE of Gb. There
exist constants ε̂ ∈ (0, a− c) and b̂ > 0 such that
(I) If 0 < ε ≤ ε̂, p0(b) is increasing for all b > 0.
(II) If ε̂ < ε < a − c, ∃ b˜(ε) ∈ (0, b̂) such that p0(b) is increasing for b ∈ (0, b˜(ε)),
decreasing for b ∈ (˜b(ε), b̂) and increasing for b > b̂.
(III) If ε ≥ a− c, p0(b) is decreasing for b ∈ (0, b̂) and increasing for b > b̂.
Proof See the Appendix.
Denote the optimal royalty by r∗. By Proposition 1, r∗ ∈ {ε, rb(ε)}. Let us write the
industry output as Q0 = Q(b, r∗). An increase in b creates a direct and an indirect
effect on Q0: the first effect captures the standard impact of an increase in marginal
cost and has a negative sign. The second effect operates via the royalty rate. Letting
dQ0
db
denote the overall marginal effect of b on Q0, we have
dQ0
db
=
∂Q0
∂b︸︷︷︸
<0
+
∂Q0
∂r︸︷︷︸
<0
· ∂r
∗
∂b︸︷︷︸
50
(8)
3As a measure of intensity of decreasing returns we take the cost elasticity, i.e., the ratio of marginal
cost over the average cost.
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If r∗ = ε, the indirect effect of b is zero and industry output decreases (price increases)
in b. If r∗ = rb(ε), (8) becomes
dQ0
db
=
∂Q0
∂b︸︷︷︸
<0
+
∂Q0
∂r︸︷︷︸
<0
· ∂rb(ε)
∂b︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
(9)
In this case, the indirect effect is positive as an increase in b reduces the level of royalty.
As a result of the two opposite effects, output has an inverse U -shape in b. In other
words, under royalty rb(ε), market price is U -shaped in b.
The specific ranges identified in Proposition 3 are due to the optimal licensing
policy. Recall by Proposition 1 that if the magnitude of innovation is low, the optimal
royalty is ε irrespective of b. So for small innovations, industry output always decreases
in b; hence price increases in b. If the magnitude of innovation is large, the royalty
charged is rb(ε) irrespective of b; market price is then U-shaped in b. Finally, if the
magnitude is intermediate, the optimal royalty is ε for low b and rb(ε) for high b. So
price is increasing for low b and it is U-shaped for high b.
Remark Our comparative statics exercise has focused on changes of b. Alternatively,
we could examine the constant term of the marginal cost line (net of the magnitude of
innovation). The impact on industry output would again be captured by an expression
similar to (8). However, in this case the direct effect would always dominate the indirect
effect.
4 Pareto-improving taxes
For this section we restrict to cases where the post-licensing price p0(b) is decreasing
in b. Let ε > ε̂ and define
b(ε) :=
{
b˜(ε) if ε̂ < ε < a− c
0 if ε ≥ a− c (10)
By Proposition 2, if ε > ε̂, then p0(b) is decreasing for b ∈ (b(ε), b̂). We will show
that in this case it is possible to design a quantity tax that lowers the market price
and benefits consumers. Moreover, the tax will generate sufficient revenue to offset the
potential losses of firms from this taxation.
Let t(q) be the tax policy that applies to any firm, i.e., any firm that sells q units
has to pay tax t(q). Take
t(q) = τq2/2 where τ > 0 (11)
As t′(q) = τq > 0 for q > 0, the marginal tax under the policy above is increasing4 in
q, i.e., this tax policy is progressive. It has the effect of raising each firm’s marginal
cost by τq, so the strategic interaction between firms under the tax policy (11) is the
same as the interaction when there is no tax but the marginal costs under existing and
new technologies are (b+ τ)q+ c and (b+ τ)q+ c−ε. Accordingly, under the tax policy
4See Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) for a discussion on non-linear taxation.
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(11) firms play the extensive-form game5 Gb+τ . Denoting by p
τ (b) the post-licensing
price under tax (11), we conclude that
pτ (b) = p0(b+ τ) (12)
For i = 1, 2, let qτi be the quantity and Π
τ
i the payoff of firm i at the SPNE of Gb+τ .
Let Sτ be the sum of payoffs of firms 1, 2; T τ the tax revenue and U τ the sum of tax
revenue and payoffs of the firms at the SPNE, i.e.,
Sτ := Πτ1 + Π
τ
2, T
τ := τ [(qτ1 )
2 + (qτ2 )
2]/2 and U τ := Sτ + T τ (13)
Note that S0, T 0, U0 correspond to the values when there is no tax (i.e. τ = 0) and in
particular T 0 = 0.
Definition A tax and transfer scheme, denoted by (t(.), f1, f2), is a scheme under
which any firm i = 1, 2 (i) pays quantity tax according to function t(q) and (ii) receives
a lump-sum transfer fi.
Proposition 3 Let ε > ε̂, τ ∈ (0, b̂− b(ε)) and b ∈ Iτ ≡ (b(ε), b̂− τ). The introduction
of tax (11) has the following effects.
(I) pτ (b) < p0(b), i.e., the tax lowers the post-licensing price.
(II) ∃ τ ∈ (0, b̂− b(ε)) such that for all τ ∈ (0, τ)
(i) Sτ < S0 i.e., the tax reduces the sum of payoffs of two firms. Consequently
it makes one or both firms worse off.
(ii) T τ > S0 − Sτ i.e., the tax generates sufficient revenue to offset the sum of
losses of firms from the tax.
(iii) ∃ a tax and transfer scheme (t(.), f1, f2) where firm i = 1, 2 pays tax accord-
ing to (11) and receives a lump-sum transfer fi such that (a) the scheme
makes consumers better off compared to no taxes, (b) Πτi + fi > Π
0
i for
i = 1, 2 i.e., the scheme makes both firms better off compared to no taxes
and (c) f1 + f2 = T
τ , i.e., the scheme is deficit-neutral.
Proof See the Appendix.
Remark Observe by Prop 3(II)(i) that the tax (11) makes at least one firm worse
off. If it makes both firms worse off, then any tax and transfer scheme satisfying Prop
3(II)(iii) must have positive lump-sum transfer for both firms, i.e., fi > 0 for i = 1, 2.
However, if tax (11) makes firm i better off and firm j worse off, then fi could be
negative (i.e. i might be required to make a lump-sum transfer, which together with
the tax revenue will compensate for the losses of j), but i would still be better off
compared to no taxes.
The quantity tax we propose essentially strengthens the intensity of diseconomies
of scale. As a result the rate of optimal royalty falls. Therefore, the tax affects the
5Recall that when there are no taxes, the game played between two firms under existing technology
(1) and new technology (2) is given by Gb, whose SPNE has been characterized in Proposition 1.
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market price directly (via the increase of diseconomies of scale) and indirectly (via the
reduction of royalty). Given the parametrization of Proposition 3, the indirect impact
dominates and price falls. The fall in price, and the subsequent increase in quantities
sold, allows the government to collect sufficient revenue to compensate firms. Hence
our tax-transfer scheme strictly Pareto improves the welfare of all agents in the market.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we show that in the presence of patent licensing in a duopoly, stronger
diseconomies of scale can benefit consumers in terms of lower prices. Using this result
we propose simple tax-transfer policies that reduce the post-licensing price and com-
pensate firms for their possible losses from taxation. Furthermore, these schemes are
deficit-neutral and hence do not impose any fiscal constraints.
We have kept our framework simple for clarity of presentation. The main driving
force of our result is the interaction of royalties with decreasing returns. Stronger
decreasing returns have the direct effect of raising the price, but they have the indirect
effect of lowering royalties which in turn reduces the price. In our model there are
regions where the indirect effect dominates the direct effect and consequently, stronger
decreasing returns result in lower market price. It is of interest to see if these regions
expand or contract in a general oligopoly model where the patent holder has more
than one rival. Another line of inquiry would be to the see the extent to which our
proposed tax-transfer schemes work when there is asymmetry of information between
the government and firms regarding certain features (e.g., strength of decreasing returns
or magnitude of the innovation) of the market. These questions are left for future
research.
Appendix
Let i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j. By (3) and (5), the profit function firm i is
pii = (a− qi − qj)qi − (c− δ)qi − bq2i /2 (14)
for some δ ∈ [0, ε], where (a) for i = 1, δ = ε and (b) for i = 2, δ = 0 if firm 2 does not
have a license and δ = ε− r ∈ [0, ε] if it has a license with royalty r.
Lemma A1 Suppose firm i has profit function (14) for some δ ∈ [0, ε]. For any b > 0,
firm i has a unique best response to any quantity qj chosen by its rival firm j, given as
Bδ(qj) =
{
(a− c+ δ − qj)/(b+ 2), if qj ∈ [0, a− c+ δ)
0, if qj ≥ a− c+ δ (15)
Proof Follows by standard computations.
Lemma A2 below describes the Nash equilibrium (NE) of the duopoly game of section
2.1. In addition to the notation used in the main text, let p(r) denote the NE price
when licensing occurs under r; let pˆ denote the NE under no licensing; and let pM , qm
denote the monopoly price and quantity.
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Lemma A2
(i) The monopoly equilibrium where the monopolist has the new technology is given
by pM = c+[(b+1)(a−c)−ε]/(b+2), qM = (a−c+ε)/(b+2), piM = (b+2)[qM ]2/2.
Furthermore, pM T c⇔ ε S (b+ 1)(a− c).
(ii) Suppose firm 2 has a license under rate of royalty r. The resulting Cournot
duopoly game has a unique NE.
(a) If ε < (b+1)(a−c), then p(r) = c+[(b+1)(a−c)−2ε+r]/(b+3); q1(r) = [(b+
1)(a−c+ε)+r]/(b+1)(b+3), q2(r) = [(b+1)(a−c+ε)−(b+2)r]/(b+1)(b+3)
and pii(r) = (b+ 2)[qi(r)]
2/2 for i = 1, 2.
(b) If ε ≥ (b + 1)(a − c), then ∃ rb(ε) ≡ (b + 1)(a − c + ε)/(b + 2) ∈ (0, ε] such
that if r ∈ [0, rb(ε)) NE price, outputs and profits are same as in (a). If
r ∈ [rb(ε), ε], then firm 2 does not produce and p(r) = pM , q1(r) = qM , i.e, a
monopoly is created with firm 1.
(c) For ε < (b + 1)(a − c), q1(r)q2(r) is decreasing for r ∈ [0, ε]; for ε ≥ (b +
1)(a − c), q1(r)q2(r) is decreasing for r ∈ [0, rb(ε)] and q1(r)q2(r) = 0 for
r ∈ [rb(ε), ε].
(iii) Suppose firm 2 does not have a license. The resulting Cournot duopoly game has
a unique NE.
(a) If ε < (b + 1)(a − c), then p̂ = c + [(b + 1)(a − c) − ε]/(b + 3) > c; q̂1 =
[(b+ 1)(a− c) + (b+ 2)ε]/(b+ 1)(b+ 3), q̂2 = [(b+ 1)(a− c)− ε]/(b+ 1)(b+ 3)
and pii = (b+ 2)[q̂i]
2/2 for i = 1, 2.
(b) If ε ≥ (b + 1)(a − c), then p̂ = pM ≤ c. Firm 2 does not produce and a
monopoly is created with firm 1.
(c) pii(ε) = pii for i = 1, 2 and p(ε) = p̂.
Proof (i) Follows by standard computations.
(ii) By Lemma A1, the best response function of firm 1 to q2 is B
ε(q2). If firm 2
has a license with rate of royalty r, its best response function to q1 is B
ε−r(q1). The
results of (a)-(b) follow by solving the system of two best response equations. To prove
(c), let ρ(r) := q1(r)q2(r). Using the expressions of q1(r), q2(r) from (a) and (b), we
observe that whenever ρ(r) > 0, it is a inverse u-shaped quadratic function. Noting
that ρ′(0) = −(a− c+ ε)/(b+ 3)2 < 0, it follows that ρ′(r) < 0 for r ≥ 0, which proves
the result.
(iii) As before, the best response function of firm 1 is Bε(q2). If firm 2 does not have
a license, its best response function is B0(q1). The results of (a)-(b) follow by solving
the system of two best response equations. The result of (c) follows by noting that
Bε−r(q1) equals B0(q1) when r = ε.
11
Let Fb(p) be the profit of the monopolist under the new technology (2) evaluated
at price p, i.e.,
Fb(p) := (p− c+ ε)Q− bQ2/2 where Q = max{a− p, 0} (16)
As pi1(r) = p(r)q1(r)−(c−ε)q1(r)−b[q1(r)]2/2 and pi2(r) = p(r)q2(r)−(c−ε+r)q2(r)−
b[q2(r)]
2/2, denoting Q(r) := q1(r) + q2(r) to be the industry output, from (7) we have
Π1(r) = (p(r)− c+ ε)Q(r)− b[(q1(r))2 + (q2(r))2]/2− pi2
Using (16) in the expression above, it follows that
Π1(r) = Fb(p(r)) + bq1(r)q2(r)− pi2 (17)
Since firm 2 obtains pi2 in any SPNE of Gb, it follows from (17) that if the royalty rate
is r in an SPNE of Gb, then the sum of payoffs of two firms is
Π1(r) + Π2(r) = Fb(p(r)) + bq1(r)q2(r) (18)
Proof of Proposition 1
(I) Case 1 ε ≥ (b+ 1)(a− c) (drastic innovations): For this case without a license
firm 2 obtains zero profit and firm 1 becomes a monopolist, i.e., pi2 = 0 and pi1 = piM . By
Lemma A2, ∃ rb(ε) ∈ [0, ε] such that if 1 chooses r ∈ [rb(ε), ε], then Π1(r) = pi1 = piM .
Therefore it is sufficient to consider policies with r ∈ [0, rb(ε)].
Using the results of Lemma A2 in (17), it follows that
Π′1(r) = [(b+1)
2(a−c+ε)−h(b)r]/(b+1)2(b+3)2 where h(b) := (b+2)(b2+4b+1) (19)
Since h(b) > 0,
Π′1(r) T 0⇔ r S rb(ε) ≡ (b+ 1)2(a− c+ ε)/h(b) > 0 (20)
As rb(ε) − rb(ε) = b(b + 1)(b + 3)(a − c + ε)/h(b) > 0, we conclude that over r ∈
[0, rb(ε)], the unique maximum of Π1(r) is attained at r = rb(ε). Thus, in particular,
Π1(rb(ε)) > Π1(rb(ε)) = piM . This proves that for any b > 0, it is optimal for firm 1 to
license to firm 2 with rate of royalty r = rb(ε) and fee pi2(rb(ε)) − pi2 = pi2(rb(ε)), so
firm 2 obtains zero net payoff. This proves the result for ε ≥ (b+ 1)(a− c).
Case 2 ε < (b + 1)(a − c) (non-drastic innovations): By Lemma A2(iii)(c) in the
Appendix, pii = pii(ε) for i = 1, 2. In particular, if firm 1 does not license, it obtains
pi1 = pi1(ε). If it offers a license with royalty r = ε, then by (7), firm 1 obtains
Π1(ε) = pi1(ε) + εq2(ε) + pi2(ε) − pi2 = pi1(ε) + εq2(ε) > pi1(ε) (since q2(ε) > 0 for
a non-drastic innovation). This proves that it is optimal for firm 1 to offer a license to
firm 2.
(II) Follows by the discussion of page 5: Recall that α = pi2(r)−pi2 and that pi2 = 0
if the innovation is drastic and pi2 > 0 if the innovation is non-drastic.
(III) For any r ∈ [0, ε], using the results of Lemma A2 in (17), it follows that for
this case too Π′(r) is also given by (19) and (20). Denote w(b) := b3 + 5b2 + 7b + 1,
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`(b) := (b+1)2/w(b) and note that both are positive, `(b) < b+1 and `(b) is decreasing
with `(0) = 1 and limb→∞ `(b) = 0. Observe that ε− rb(ε) = w(b)[ε− `(b)(a− c)]/h(b).
Hence ε T rb(ε)⇔ ε T `(b)(a− c).
If ε > `(b)(a − c), then ε > rb(ε) and by (20), the unique maximum of Π1(r) is
attained at r = rb(ε); the resulting fixed fee is thus positive. This proves the result for
`(b)(a− c) < ε < (b+ 1)(a− c).
If ε ≤ `(b)(a − c), then rb(ε) ≥ ε and by (20), the unique maximum of Π1(r) is
attained at r = ε where the fixed fee is α = pi2(ε)−pi2 = pi2(ε)−pi2(ε) = 0. This proves
the result for ε ≤ `(b)(a− c).
The properties of rb(ε) with respect to b follows by standard computations.
Proof of Proposition 2 Recall that p(r) = c+ [(b+ 1)(a− c)− 2ε+ r]/(b+ 3) is the
Cournot price with royalty r when both firms are active in the market. Then,
p0 =
{
p(rb(ε)) if ε > `(b)(a− c)
p(ε) if ε ≤ `(b)(a− c) (21)
Noting that rb(ε) = (b+ 1)
2(a− c+ ε)/(b+ 2)(b2 + 4b+ 1), it follows that
∂p(rb(ε))/∂b = y(b)(a− c+ ε)/[h(b)]2 where y(b) := 2b4 + 10b3 + 15b2 + 4b− 1
and ∃ b̂ ∈ (0.15, 0.16) such that ∂p(rb(ε))/∂b T 0 ⇔ b T b̂. We consider the following
cases.
Case 1 ε ≥ a− c: Since `(0) = 1 and `(b) is decreasing, for this case ε > `(b)(a− c)
for all b > 0 and by (21), p0 = p(rb(ε)). So for this case, p
0 is decreasing for b ∈ (0, b̂)
and increasing for b > b̂ which proves (III).
Case 2 0 < ε < a − c: Since `(0) = 1, `(b) is decreasing and limb→∞ `(b) = 0,
∃ b˜(ε) > 0 such that ε T `(b)(a − c) ⇔ b T b˜(ε). From the properties of `(b), it
follows that b˜(ε) is decreasing with limε↑a−c b˜(ε) = 0 and limε↓0 b˜(ε) =∞. Therefore, ∃
ε̂ ∈ (0, a− c) such that b̂ S b˜(ε)⇔ ε S ε̂.
Case 2(a) 0 < ε ≤ ε̂: For this case, b̂ ≤ b˜(ε). If b ∈ (0, b˜(ε)], then ε ≤ `(b)(a − c)
and by (21), p0 = p(ε), which is increasing in b. If b > b˜(ε), then ε > `(b)(a − c) and
p0 = p(rb(ε)) which is increasing in b (since b > b˜(ε) ≥ b̂). By continuity of p0 it follows
that p0 is increasing for all b > 0. This proves (I).
Case 2(b) ε̂ < ε < a−c: For this case, b̂ > b˜(ε). If b ∈ (0, b˜(ε)], then ε ≤ `(b)(a−c)
and p0 = p(ε), which is increasing in b. If b > b˜(ε), then ε > `(b)(a−c) and p0 = p(rb(ε)),
which is decreasing for b ∈ (˜b(ε), b̂) and increasing otherwise. Therefore for this case
p0 is increasing for b ∈ (0, b˜(ε)), decreasing for b ∈ (˜b(ε), b̂) and increasing for b > b̂.
This proves (II).
Lemma A3 Let τ ∈ (0, b̂ − b(ε)) and b ∈ Iτ ≡ (b(ε), b̂ − τ). Consider the functions
given in (13). As functions of τ, Sτ is decreasing and T τ , U τ are both increasing at
τ = 0.
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Proof As the SPNE price of Gb+τ is p
0(b + τ), from (18) it follows that the sum of
payoffs of firms at the SPNE is
Sτ = Fb+τ (p
0(b+ τ))− bqτ1qτ2 (22)
where Fb(p) is given in (16). Since b+ τ ∈ (b(ε), b̂), from the proof of Prop 2 we know
that at the SPNE of Gb+τ , firm 1 sets royalty rb+τ (ε) where rb(ε) is given in (20). The
quantities qτ1 , q
τ
2 and the price p
0(b+ τ) is obtained from Lemma A2(ii) by replacing b
by b+ τ and taking r = rb+τ (ε). Denoting κ(b) := (a− c+ ε)2/2[h(b)]2 > 0, from (13)
and (22),
dSτ
dτ
[τ = 0] = −κ(b)(b+ 1)(2b3 + 6b2 + 3b+ 1) < 0,
dT τ
dτ
[τ = 0] = κ(b)(2b4 +10b3 +15b2 +6b+1) > 0,
dU τ
dτ
[τ = 0] = κ(b)2b(b2 +2b+1) > 0
This proves the result.
Proof of Proposition 3 (I) For any b ∈ Iτ , both b, b + τ ∈ (b(ε), b̂) and by Prop 2,
p0(b+ τ) < p0(b). Using (12), it follows that pτ (b) = p0(b+ τ) < p0(b).
(II) Since as function of τ, Sτ is decreasing and U τ is increasing at τ = 0 (see
Lemma A3 of the Appendix), ∃ a sufficiently small τ ∈ (0, b̂ − b(ε)) such that for all
τ ∈ (0, τ):
Sτ < S0 and U τ > U0 (23)
The first inequality of (23) proves (i). As U τ = Sτ +T τ and T 0 = 0, the last inequality
of (23) implies
T τ > S0 − Sτ = (Π01 − Πτ1) + (Π02 − Πτ2) (24)
which proves (ii).
Since lump-sum transfer do not affect market prices, (iii)(a) is immediate from (I).
Denote T τ − (S0 − Sτ ) ≡ d > 0 and take fi = Π0i − Πτi + d/2 for i = 1, 2. Then
Πτi + fi = Π
0
i + d/2 > Π
0
i for i = 1, 2 and by (24), f1 + f2 = S
0 − Sτ + d = T τ . This
proves (b) and (c).
References
Arrow, K.J., 1962. Economic welfare and the allocation of resources for invention. In:
R.R. Nelson (Ed.), The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social
Factors, Princeton Univ. Press, pp. 609-625.
Atkinson, A.B., Stiglitz, J.E., 1976. The design of tax structure: Direct vs indirect
taxation. Journal of Public Economics, 6, 55-75.
Auerbach, A. Hines J., 2001. Perfect taxation with imperfect competition. NBER
Working Paper 8138.
Baumol, W. 1972. On taxation and the control of externalities, American Economic
Review, LXII, 307-332.
14
Carlton, D.W., Loury, G.C. 1980. The limitations of Pigouvian taxes as a long-run
remedy for externalities, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 95, 559-566.
Dillen M., 1995. Corrective tax and subsidy policies in economies with Bertrand com-
petition. Journal of Public Economics, 58, 267-282.
Geanakoplos, J., Polemarchakis, H.M., 2008. Pareto improving taxes, Journal of Math-
ematical Economics, 44, 682-696.
Greenwald, B., Stiglitz, J.E., 1986. Externalities in economies with imperfect informa-
tion and incomplete markets. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100, 229-264.
Kamien, M.I., Tauman, Y., 1984. The private value of a patent: a game theoretic
analysis. Zeitschrift fu¨r Nationalo¨konomie, 4 (Supplement), 93-118.
Kamien, M.I., Tauman, Y., 1986. Fees versus royalties and the private value of a
patent. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101, 471-491.
Kamien, M.I., 1992. Patent Licensing, in Handbook of Game Theory, vol.1, 331-354,
Elsevier.
Katz, M.L., Shapiro, C., 1985. On the licensing of innovations. RAND Journal of
Economics, 16, 504-520.
Katz, M.L., Shapiro, C., 1986. How to license intangible property. Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 101, 567-589.
Konishi H., Okuno-Fujiwara M., Suzumura K., 1990. Oligopolistic competition and
economic welfare: A general equilibrium analysis of entry regulation and tax-subsidy
schemes. Journal of Public Economics, 42, 67-88.
de Meza, D., Maloney, J., Myles G.D., 1995. Price-reducing taxation. Economics
Letters, 47, 77-81.
Pigou, A.C., 1932. The Economics of Welfare, Second Ed. Macmillan.
Shapiro, C., 1985. Patent licensing and R&D rivalry. American Economic Review,
Papers and Proceedings, 75, 25-30.
Ushio Y., 2000. Welfare effects of commodity taxation in Cournot oligopoly. The
Japanese Economic Review, 51, 268-273.
Wang, X.H., 1998. Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model. Economics
Letters 60, 55-62.
Wang, H., 2011. Optimal indirect taxation under imperfect competition. Working
Paper.
15
